Chapter 5, on the UN system, provides necessary background information rather than being a comparative case study per se. Chapters 6 through 11 examine partic- ular organizations and issue-areas through the lenses of theories of international organization. Chapter 6 looks at issues of peace and security, focusing on the con- cept of collective security and on the organizations involved in the collective secu- rity system.
Chapter 8 deals with the international political economy. Chapter 10 is organized around a discussion of IOs that deal with some of the more mundane aspects of international life, but on which life in the modern world has come to depend.
Chapter 11 looks at some organizations that lie at the bor- der of our definition of intergovernmental institutions. Finally, Chapter 12 revisits the basic questions underlying this book: Do international institutions matter, and how do we study them? What is the place of inter- national organizations IOs in world politics? International organizations, defined here as inclusive intergovernmental organizations, are a relatively new phenomenon in international relations.
They first appeared on the scene a little more than a centu- ry ago, in a modern state system that had already been around for more than years. Before the advent of inclusive IOs there had been military alliances, exclusive intergovernmental organizations, among sovereign states.
Predating the state system altogether were important international non-state actors such as the Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Empire. But these actors were not intergovernmental—they were not created by states, but rather existed independently of them.
The first organizations created by treaties among states designed specifically to deal with problems that a number of states faced in common appeared in the nine- teenth century. At first they were designed to address very specific issues of an eco- nomic and technical nature, such as creating clear rules for navigation on the Rhine River, delivering international mail, or managing the Pacific fur seal fishery in a sus- tainable manner.
The best known of these organizations was the League of Nations, created to help its member nations to maintain international peace and security, and avoid a repeat of the horrors of the war. But other organizations with relatively broad mandates were created as well, such as the International Labour Organization ILO , the charter of which allows the organization to deal with inter- national labor issues, broadly defined. In the aftermath of the war, the League was replaced by an even more ambitious organization, the UN.
A primary goal of the UN, as stated in its Charter, is to deal with the same sorts of issues of international peace and security that the League was supposed to deal with. According to the Union of International Associations, the number of intergovernmental organizations crossed 1, in the early s, and by the early twenty-first century, there were more than 5, International relations scholarship has traditionally regarded the sovereign state as the central institution in international politics.
Recently, par- ticularly in the past ten years, the concept of globalization has begun to appear in the international relations literature. A key implication of globalization is that the state is losing its autonomy as the central locus of decision-making in international rela- tions.
The debate between those who see the sovereign state as the key institution in world politics and those who see the process of globalization as displacing states is a good place to start the discussion of the role of IOs in international relations. Sovereignty When we think about international relations, we think primarily about the system of sovereign states.
There are two key parts to such a system, what we might call internal sovereignty and external sovereignty. Internal sovereignty refers to autono- my, the ability of the state to make and enforce its own rules domestically. External sovereignty refers to the recognition of the state by other states, the acceptance of the state by the international community. Taiwan, for example, has a level of internal sover- eignty that is equivalent to that of many other industrialized countries.
But it does not have full external sovereignty, and as a result cannot participate in many UN activities that lead to the creation of international rules. The Democratic Republic of the Congo, by contrast, has full external sovereignty, and can thus participate more fully in international activities. But it has limited internal sovereignty, because it has no control over what happens in much of its territory.
Empires, rather than sovereign states, wrote much of the political history of ancient civilizations, and the feudal era in Europe featured over- lapping and territorially indistinct patterns of political authority. The genesis of the current system of states has often been dated back to , when the Peace of Westphalia ended the Thirty Years War by diminishing the political role of many tiers of the feudal nobility.
While this is a simplification of history, much of the sys- tem of sovereign states as we know it emerged in seventeenth-century Europe. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, princes were sov- ereign. From the perspective of the international community, a country was the property of its ruler, and representatives of the country represented the interests of the ruler, rather than of the population.
Beginning in the nineteenth century, and even more so in the twentieth, citizens became sovereign. Rulers became represen- tative of their populations, rather than the other way around. This helps to explain the genesis of intergovernmental cooperation through IOs in the nineteenth century.
Globalization But is this cooperation, and the increased prevalence of IOs that results from it, undermining sovereignty? The most popular set of arguments that it is can be called the globalization approach.
There are two effects of these forces. The first is an increasing tendency to act multilaterally rather than unilaterally—in other words, to create and act through IOs. In international trade issues, for example, many states participate in the World Trade Organization WTO for fear of being ignored by international investors and transnational corporations TNCs if they do not. Globalization can undermine both internal and external sovereignty.
It can undermine internal sovereignty by diminishing state autonomy. The more practical decision-making power is transferred from governments to both IOs and non- governmental actors, the less ability states have to meaningfully make policy deci- sions. This can affect some states more than others. The United States, for example, has much more input into the making and changing of WTO rules than, say, Singapore, even though Singapore, being much more of a trading nation than the United States, is affected more by the rules.
Globalization can undermine external sovereignty by loosening the monopoly of the sovereign state system on international political activity. This argument suggests that the more decision-making autonomy that IOs get, the more scope private actors such as NGOs have to participate in international policy-making, and the weaker the traditional state system becomes.
Furthermore, the more that IOs are looked to as the arbiters of regulation internationally, the more TNCs may be able to avoid being subject to national regulations, further weakening the state system.
Of those who see IOs as helping to undermine state autonomy, some see it as a good thing, others as a bad thing. Some human rights and environmental activists, for example, see internationalization as the only effective check on regulatory races to the bottom. In the early days of the Cold War, propo- nents of world government saw it as the best way to avoid perhaps the ultimate transnational problem, large-scale nuclear war. The language of the debate has changed from world government to globalization, and the idea of a centralized world government has given way to one of a more diffuse form of global governance, but the basic issues being debated have not changed fundamentally.
But are those who believe that globalization is undermining sovereignty right? The realist tradition sees states in a situation of anarchy, with little to constrain them except the power of other states. The univer- salist tradition looks not to international politics, understood as politics among states, but to a global politics, which represents people directly as individuals rather than through states.
Each of these three traditions takes a very different view of IOs, and each view can be instructive in helping us to understand the role of these organi- zations in international relations.
Realism looks to the role of IOs in international relations with some skepticism. For realists, the ultimate arbiter of outcomes in international relations is power.
Outcomes can be expected to favor those with the most power, or those who bring their power to bear most effectively.
And for realists, in the contemporary world, states are the organizations with the most power. Having no independent military capability, they depend on states to enforce their rules. Having no ability to tax, they depend on states to fund them. Having no territory, they depend on states to host them. As such, IOs can only really succeed when backed by powerful states. For realists, then, it makes little sense to focus attention on IOs, because IOs reflect the existing balance of power and the interests of powerful states.
As such, it makes more sense to understand IOs as tools in the power struggles of states, than as independent actors or independent effects. It sees states in international society as some- what analogous to people in domestic society.
Domestic society works because most people follow most of its rules most of the time. Similarly, analysts of the interna- tionalist tradition argue that most states follow most international law most of the time. Even during times of war, when we would expect international society to be at its weakest, states usually follow certain rules of acceptable conduct.
Rather, they recognize that they all benefit from a society that is rule-governed, and are therefore willing to accept rules if those rules bind others as well. From this perspective, IOs become the expressions of the rules that govern international soci- ety. Whether or not IOs have an independent effect as actors in international rela- tions depends on whether they create the rules, or simply oversee rules created by agreement among states.
But in either case, IOs are important because they regu- late relations among states. It is important to note here, though, that from this per- spective, states are still seen as the primary actors in international relations.
The universalist tradition differs fundamentally from both the realist and inter- nationalist traditions in that it is not state-centric. Whereas the internationalist tra- dition sees states as constrained by the norms of a society of states, the universalist tradition sees states as increasingly irrelevant in the face of a developing global soci- ety, a society of people rather than of states. This tradition shares with the interna- tionalist tradition the presupposition that domestic society works as much because its population accepts its rules as because the state enforces them.
The difference is that the internationalist tradition applies this by analogy to states, whereas the uni- versalist tradition applies it to people globally. In this tra- dition, IOs are more important as expressions of, and creators of, global civil soci- ety than they are as regulators of relations among states.
The pure real- ist answer to the question of the future of sovereignty is that the sovereign state sys- tem is continuing much the same as always. States remain the locus of power in the international system. Therefore, external sovereignty can be expected to remain as strong as ever, because states, the organizations with the power, have an interest in keeping it that way.
Larger states are not losing autonomy to IOs, because those same large states are creating the rules of those organizations. Smaller, weaker states, it is true, do lack autonomy in the face of some IOs, but these states were always subject to a similar degree to the preferences of the larger, more powerful states. The greater the extent to which IOs make rules that reflect global civil society, the less autonomy states have to make rules domestically that are incongruent with international norms.
By the same logic, globalization also undermines external sovereignty, as IOs, NGOs, and other representatives of global civil society begin to replace states as the legitimate representatives of the global cit- izenry. As international society, as represented by IOs, becomes stronger, states are increasingly bound to make rules collectively rather than individually. For example, as states participate increasingly in international trade, they gain a greater stake in trade rules that everyone shares, because trade would be hurt by the absence of such rules.
This leaves states with less autonomy to make rules that conflict with those embodied in IOs. At the same time, however, the internationalist tradition agrees with the realist that the sovereign state system remains strong in the face of global- ization.
Rules are being made by states collectively rather than individually, but they are still being made by states. This increasing tendency of states to make rules collectively is often labeled mul- tilateralism and is the basis of a school of analysis located within the international- ist tradition. Unilateralism refers to a state acting alone, bilateralism to two states acting together.
Multilateralism refers to a system in which it is expected that states will act as a group, through negotiation and IOs. The multilateralist school of analysis argues that multilateralism has, in the past half century or so, become the expected way of doing business internationally. As such, multilateralism is a concept that will reappear regularly throughout this book.
Multilateralism can be seen as a form of globalization. In fact, antiglobalization protestors often point to multilateral organizations, such as the WTO and the IMF, as undermining national autonomy, the ability of countries to make trade and mon- etary policy to suit local conditions.
But it is also possible to argue that the state system as a whole, and with it external sovereignty, is actually made stronger when IOs are responsible for international decision-making. Multilateralism, and internationalist logic more generally, sees states, as opposed to other political actors or other potential repre- sentatives of global civil society, as the key decision-makers and policy-makers in global politics.
To the extent that only states have votes in IOs and that only states participate in multilateral decision-making, multilateralism reinforces the role of the state. In other words, rather than undermining sovereignty, the multilateralist system is creating a new kind of sovereignty.
A good example of the tension between the internationalist and the universalist impulses in the creation of IOs can be found in the European Union EU.
The EU is an IO whose members share a common market for international trade and com- mon legislation on a wide variety of issues ranging from social policy to environ- mental policy. The EU also has its own legal institutions and is developing its own foreign policy and military capability. This makes the EU the most wide-ranging and comprehensive IO. It has twenty-five members from throughout Europe, including ten countries from central and eastern Europe and the Mediterranean that became members in May of There are three central bodies that participate in making EU policy and legislation.
The first is the European Commission, which is a bureaucracy made up of commis- sioners who come from all the member countries, but who are meant to represent the EU rather than the country that appointed them. Conversely, the third body, the Council of Ministers, is made up of national politicians whose job is to represent their countries in making EU policy. The Commission and the Parliament can be seen as exercises in universalism.
They are pan-European bodies that are supposed to both represent and develop a pan-European political consciousness. The Council, on the other hand, is more straightforwardly internationalist.
It is an intergovernmental body in which partici- pants representing individual countries act in the name of member governments to promote the national interest of those countries.
The evolution of the EU, and its current politics, reflects this institutional compromise between a universalist EU and an internationalist EU. Either way, members of the EU have given up broad swathes of their decision-making autonomy—they are committed to enact regulations decided upon at the EU level.
But individual states remain much more important actors in the Council, where they are directly involved in decision-making, than they are in the Commission and Parliament, where they are not. One way is as descriptions of what is actually happening in the world of IOs. Each tradition allows us to look at an institution from a different perspective and thereby learn different things about it.
Looking, for example, at the WTO, an inter- nationalist lens allows us to observe the ways in which states are cooperating for their collective benefit. A realist lens allows us to observe the ways in which the more powerful states can achieve rules closer to their interests than to the interests of weaker states.
A universalist lens allows us to observe the ways in which the WTO as an organization, and the idea of a rules-based trade system as a norm, are replacing states as the locus of real decision-making in issues of international trade.
The balance among these three perspectives may well differ from organization to organization. Some IOs, for example, might offer greater scope for power politics than others, and some might engage in more universalist, rather than intergovern- mental, decision-making than others. But we can address this balance empirically, by studying individual IOs and what they do. This balance will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter. The other way to look at the three traditions is normatively.
Looked at this way, each tradition describes not the way in which IOs do work, but the way in which they should work. Realists believe that the state should represent the interests of its citizens rather than pursue a global common good. Universalists often see direct global governance, rather than a competitive state system, as an ultimate goal.
And to internationalists, a society of states regulated by IOs combines the best of both the realist and the universalist traditions. Whether or not any one of these traditions provides a more accurate description of contemporary international politics than the other two is open to empirical argu- ment. But these traditions can also be used normatively, as sources of moral argu- ments about what international politics should look like. One illustrative line of moral argumentation concerns the relationship between IOs and democracy.
None of these perspectives is inherently more or less right than the others, and all provide perspectives worth considering. Realism There is a tendency to see the realist tradition as amoral, as simply a practical acceptance of the reality of power politics.
But there is a democratic argument to be made for retaining state autonomy in matters of decision-making. Allowing nation- states to make their own rules allows different cultures to govern themselves as they see fit. Autonomy also fosters competition among states for better governance. World government, its critics might argue, is no more than a lowest common denominator, and encounters little pressure to improve.
If the state defers to a global good while other states pursue their own interests, then the state, and its citizens, lose. There are three key empirical arguments against this realist perspective on the morality and democratic legitimacy of power politics. The first is that because of power disparities among states, only the interests of those who happen to live in powerful states determine international outcomes. Realism thus looks very differ- ent from the perspective of the United States than it does from the perspective of the Central African Republic.
The second is that as the issues facing states are increasingly global in nature, global rather than national solutions are needed. Attempts to deal with issues such as climate change, air traffic control, or the inter- national financial architecture through purely national policy are futile.
The third argument against the realist perspective that state decision-making autonomy is preferable to collective decision-making is that competition among states can do much more harm than good. Competition can lead to stable balances of power, and it can lead to policy innovation. But it can also lead to hostility and war, in a way that multilateral or universalist cooperation are unlikely to.
Because multilateralism is a process in which all concerned states can participate, both the more powerful ones and the weaker ones, it allows all peoples to be represented in the making of international rules. To the extent that the trend internationally is for more states to become democratic, the link between representative government at the domestic level and representative government at the international level is even stronger.
International organizations then become representative bodies of states, which are themselves representative bodies of citizens. As is the case with domestic legisla- tures, decisions are made by elected representatives of the people.
Where internationalists see democratic representation, some critics see decision-making behind closed doors by an international elite. Others see the process of negotiation leading up to the creation of IOs and the modification of their rules as an exercise in the finding of lowest common denominators that often please no one.
Universalists see negotiations among states as favoring existing national elites, and as freezing out the institutions of international civil society, such as NGOs. Antiglobalization protestors at meetings of the WTO or of the international finan- cial institutions IFIs, primarily the IMF and World Bank indeed attack these mul- tilateral negotiating forums from both perspectives; economic nationalists argue that these IOs need tighter rules or no rules, while universalists demand more direct participation for NGOs that represent human rights or environmental issues.
Universalism Universalists argue that it is only through the direct representation of global civil society that international relations can become more democratic. As such, any effort to improve direct representation by separating IOs from direct control by member states is a positive development. At present, the two most common ways of ensur- ing that this happens are increasing the autonomy of IOs and increasing NGO par- ticipation in them.
But both independent IO decision-making and NGO participation can also be criticized as antidemocratic. Nongovernmental organizations may well be expres- sions of global civil society, but they are not elected, and they represent the inter- ests of their members, not of the population at large. In this sense, NGOs can be criticized as being neocolonial, as a mechanism for reintroducing rule by the West over the South through nonmilitary means. Conclusion Most of this book looks at IOs at the micro level, at the workings of particular IOs and their effects within their issue-areas.
Of the four distinctions discussed in the introduction, that between sovereignty and globalization is the only one that focuses broadly on the effects of IOs on gov- ernance patterns, rather than on governance outcomes within particular issue- areas. This broad focus provides both an opportunity and a potential pitfall. The pitfall is getting stuck at the general level.
The distinction between sovereignty and globalization is nonetheless both a good starting point for discussions of IOs, and something worth keeping in mind when looking at IOs at the micro level. In particular, it is worth asking, as one looks at the effectiveness of an IO in dealing with a particular issue-area, does this present a good model of the way the world should be governed?
This distinction is related to that between sovereignty and globalization. The realist tradition assumes that power is the ulti- mate arbiter of outcomes in international relations.
Both the internationalist and the universalist traditions take interdependence as a basic assumption. Dependence refers to a situation in which a state cannot effectively make and enforce policy on its own, but can do so only in cooperation with another country or countries. Interdependence is when these other countries, in turn, also find themselves dependent on the first country.
A key part of the concept of interdependence, then, is reciprocity. The universalist response is the replacement of states by centralization of decision-making. One interpretation of the internationalist tradition would be that with multilat- eral cooperation in decision-making, cooperation would replace power as the focus of international politics.
The debate between the pure cooperation position and the pure power position has often taken place using the language of absolute and rela- tive gains. For example, if a bilateral free trade agreement increases gross economic output of the two countries that have signed it by 3 per- cent over what would have been the case without the agreement, and both coun- tries share in that increase equally, then both countries would have absolute gains of 3 percent in their GDPs.
Relative gains are gains that a state makes in comparison with its rivals. For example, if two rival states increase their military force levels by 3 percent each, neither will have made a relative gain, because their force levels would have stayed the same relative to each other. If one state makes a gain of 4 percent and the other a gain of 2 percent, both states would have gained in absolute terms, but in relative terms, one state would have gained and the other would have lost.
Realists, who tend to see issues of security as paramount, argue that in measures of military capabilities only relative gains matter, because military capabilities are measured against the capabilities of other states.
Economists, for whom trade issues are paramount, usually focus on absolute gains, because what matters to them is the ability of individuals to consume. Therefore, they focus on the amount available to individuals with international cooperation compared with the amount available to the same individuals without cooperation.
In multilateral negotiations, states generally care about both a good overall outcome and an outcome that reflects their own particular national interests, although the balance between the two can vary. In other words, both interdependence and power matter. The question for students of IOs then becomes, How do we study and contrast these two phenomena? In some parts of the world, such as India and Pakistan, military power still matters.
But, argue Keohane and Nye, in other parts of the world, such as the United States and Canada, the military balance is largely irrelevant, because neither country considers the use of force to settle bilateral disputes. As already mentioned, one of these characteristics is that military force plays a minor role in settling dis- putes. A second characteristic is that states have multiple channels of communica- tion with each other.
In essence, this means that national bureaucracies negotiate directly with each other. For example, if the United States and Canada are negoti- ating a fisheries agreement, it will probably be negotiated between officials of the National Marine Fisheries Service and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, rather than by the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister. On other issues, other sets of bureaucrats in different bureaucratic hierarchies negotiate with each other, often without much central coordination.
The third characteristic is that there is no clear hierarchy of issues. In a traditional realist world, national security issues matter more than other issues. In a complex interdependent world, states do not clearly prioritize issues. A diverse array of issue-areas, ranging from security to trade, finance, the environment, human rights, telecommunications policy, and health policy may find their way onto the international agenda, but states do not clearly prioritize among them.
This complex interdependent world is similar to the globalized world, with coop- eration among states, envisioned by internationalists, as discussed in Chapter 1. Keohane and Nye do not conclude from this, however, that power has become irrelevant.
Military power continues to be important in those parts of the world that are less involved in complex interdependent multilat- eralism. And even in the core of the complex interdependent world, power remains relevant. The difference is that power in a multilateralist world no longer comes pri- marily from the threat of military force, because such threats are rarely credible. Rather, in these contexts, power comes from asymmetries in interdependence. Should the relationship be terminated, it would hurt State A much more than State B.
As an example, during the oil crisis of —, many Western states depended on Persian Gulf states for petrole- um, but the Gulf states did not depend on Western states for anything as critical in the short term. This gave the Gulf states after an embargo of a few months, to show that their threat of terminating the relationship was credible the power to dictate oil prices to Western states and contract terms to Western oil companies. As such, neither state can credibly threaten to terminate or impede their relationship, because everyone knows that this would be equally costly to both states.
This means that neither state can gain an advantage in bargaining power from the level of dependence of the other. To continue with the example used above, in the s, most Western countries reduced their dependence on petroleum from the Persian Gulf by improving their energy efficiency and by finding other sources of supply. At the same time, many of the states in the Gulf became more dependent on the West for trade, services, and security.
These trends reduced asym- metries in dependence to the point where the Gulf states could no longer credibly expect that the threat of an embargo would allow them to dictate prices. Perfectly interdependent relationships, however, are not the norm in international relations, even in a complex interdependent world. In between pure dependence and perfect interdependence, there are asymmetries in interdependence.
This is when all countries depend on each other, but some more than others. For example, both the United States and Singapore would suffer if the WTO, and with it, mul- tilateral rules on international trade, collapsed.
But the Singaporean economy is much more dependent on trade than the U. As a general rule, the greater the asymmetry of interdependence, the greater the rela- tive power of the less-dependent country. Keohane and Nye look at these issues from a primarily internationalist perspec- tive. A complex interdependent world is one in which states are still the primary agents of governance internationally, but in which they approach this governance multilaterally rather than unilaterally.
From this perspective, the primary question of the role of power in the study of IOs is how state power manifests itself in the creation and management of IOs. From a universalist perspective, the question is different. Power in IOs Beginning with the internationalist perspective, there are a number of sources of state power and a number of ways in which the power of particular states can be expressed in the creation and management of IOs.
Power can be expressed in nego- tiations, in the setting of agendas, and in the creation of institutional bureaucracies and procedures. Sources of power include asymmetries of interdependence among countries, asymmetrical dependence of IOs on particular countries, structural power, and ideology.
The most straightforward expression of state power in the creation of IOs and multilateral rules is negotiating power. In practice, it can be a little more difficult to identify negotiating power. State A might have made a concession on some other issue, or State B might sim- ply have cared less about this particular issue than State A.
But on the whole, it is clear that some states, such as the United States, have more overall negotiating power in multilateral forums than others, such as Monaco or Burundi. Negotiating power looks at who gets their way on an issue that comes up for discussion.
The second face of power looks at who gets to set the negotiating agenda in the first place, or, who gets to decide what gets talked about and what does not. Agenda-setting power can be more difficult to study than negotiating power, because it involves looking at what does not happen, rather than at what does.
The negotiations were based on the idea that each state would cut back greenhouse gas emissions a certain amount from their existing emission levels. As a result, the states that polluted the most before the negotiations can con- tinue to pollute the most under the terms of the Protocol. This approach can be seen as favoring states that came into the negotiations as particularly heavy pol- luters, and as penalizing both countries that were more environmentally responsi- ble in the past and countries that were too poor to have polluted much at that point.
Other pollution baselines, such as one based on national population, are conceivable, but were not on the negotiating agenda. Does this mean that none of the states were interested in talking about this possibility, or that some states had an interest in keeping this possibility off the agenda and had the power to do so?
Arriving at an answer requires looking in considerable detail at the prenegotiation process, the process through which the agenda was decided. Textbook solutions for Topology 2nd Edition Munkres and others in this series.
A solutions manual for Topology by James. Source code zip. I have been There are hundreds of books available here, in all sorts of interesting genres, and all of. Page 2. A solutions manual for Topology by James Munkres.
Source code zip ; Links to solutions Munkres is a very popular textbook, and Munkres Solutions. Introduction To Topology Mathematics On Amazon Com ZIP 23???
Takumi Murayama.. Other proofs are discussed, in particular, Conway's ZIP proof. The solution consists of two steps: a topological step and a The second step consists in showing that every triangulated surface can be Piaggio Zip 50 Repair Suppose UThis munkres solutions section 30, as one of the most full of zip sellers View step-by Download Siberian In chapter 2, the author considers the solution set of a system of equations Note: This book is available for free on the author's webpage: book.
Topology 2nd Ed. However, there are yet many people who after that Topology by James R Munkres The Analysis on Manifolds by James R. Munkres Topology with Solutions dbFin. Read Topology James Munkres Solutions. If you ally need such a referred munkres chapter 2 solutions ebook Functions 03 Munkres Topology 1. Chapter 2 Highway to Heck? Games by James Games 3 years ago.. Basis for a topology Product topology Subspace topology Munkres 13, 15, 16 Jan Problems Munkres Homework Section 13 2, 3, 7 Sections 2, 3, 10 Find James Munkres solutions at Chegg.
Takumi Murayama December 20, These solutions are the Chapter 1 Topology 2nd Edition : James Munkres: Takumi Murayama The required text for this course is M. Armstrong's Basic Topology. You may also find Topology 2nd edition by James Munkres helpful, and I suggest International Business Management subject is included in MBA so students are able to download international business management notes for MBA 2nd year and international business management notes for MBA 4th semester.
International Business Management Notes can be downloaded in international business management pdf from the below article. A detailed international business management syllabus as prescribed by various Universities and colleges in India are as under. You can download the syllabus in international business management pdf form. International Business — Definition — Internationalizing business-Advantages —factors causing globalization of business- international business environment — country attractiveness — Political, economic and cultural environment — Protection Vs liberalization of global business environment.
Strategic compulsions-Standardization Vs Differentiation — Strategic options — Global portfolio management- global entry strategy — different forms of international business — advantages — organizational issues of international business — organizational structures — controlling of international business — approaches to control — performance of global businessperformance evaluation system.
Global production —Location —scale of operations- cost of production — Make or Buy decisions — global supply chain issues — Quality considerations- Globalization of markets, marketing strategy — Challenges in product development , pricing, production and channel management- Investment decisions — economic- Political risk — sources of fund- exchange —rate risk and management — strategic orientation — selection of expatriate managers- Training and development — compensation.
Disadvantages of international business — Conflict in international business- Sources and types of conflict — Conflict resolutions — Negotiation — the role of international agencies —Ethical issues in international business — Ethical decision-making.
International business may be defined simply as business transactions that take place across national borders. Nearly all business enterprises, large and small, are inspired to carry on business across the globe. This may include, purchase of raw materials, from foreign suppliers, assembling products from components made in several countries or selling products or services to customers in other nations.
0コメント